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It was hypothesized that intrinsic religiousness helps to cope with
increased salience of terrorism. Intrinsically religious and non-
religious participants were told that it is highly probable or highly
improbable, respectively, that terrorist attacks will occur in Ger-
many. High probability of terrorism only negatively affected the
mood of nonreligious participants but not of intrinsically re-
ligious participants (Study 1). Using as a realistic context of
investigation the terrorist suicide bombings in Istanbul, the
authors replicated this finding and shed some light on the under-
lying psychological processes (Study 2): On the day of the terrorist
attacks (high salience of terrorism), nonreligious participants
experienced less positive emotions and less self-efficacy than did
intrinsically religious participants. Two months later (low sali-
ence of terrorism), no differences were found between nonreli-
gious and intrinsically religious participants with regard to
mood and self-efficacy. Mediational analyses suggested that the
mood effects were associated with differences in the reported sense
of self-efficacy.
Keywords: salience of terrorism; coping; religiousness; self-efficacy;
mood; positive and negative emotions
Following the devastating terror attack on the World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001 (9/11), interna-
tional Islamic terrorism reached Europe with the suicide
bombing in a mosque in Istanbul on November 20, 2003,
and the disastrous train bombings in Madrid on March
11, 2004. As a consequence, the salience of terrorism
might have increased in the European population,
which could pose a serious problem for their mental
health. When we look outside Europe, the postulated
negative impact of terror salience on mental health is
supported by U.S. polls in the days following the attacks
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001: It
was found that 70% had cried about the terror attacks
(Saad, 2001) and 50% to 70% indicated feeling de-
pressed (Institute for Social Research, 2001). When U.S.
Americans were asked about the emotions they experi-
enced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, they most
frequently reported anger, fear, sadness, and anxiety:
More than 60% of respondents said their personal sense
of security was negatively affected by the attacks (Saad,
2001) and (compared to 24% in the preceding year)
54% feared that they or members of their family would
become a victim of a future terrorist attack (Fredrickson,
Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003; Gallup News Service,
2001). Even 6 months after the terrorist attacks,
posttraumatic stress symptoms in the U.S. population
still remained elevated (Silver, Holman, McIntosh,
Poulin, & Gil-Rivas, 2002).
In sum, there is considerable evidence from U.S. polls
that increased salience of terrorism negatively affects
people’s emotions. Since al-Qaida terrorism has now
arrived in Europe with an increase in number and bru-
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tality of terrorist attacks as well, similar reactions also
might be found among the European population. As a
consequence, in the present article, we raise the follow-
ing questions: How can/do people cope with the nega-
tive effect of the increased salience of terrorism on their
emotions? One answer could be the following: From the
coping literature, we know that religiousness plays an
outstanding role in the list of protective factors against
negative life events. An old adage says that “there are no
atheists in foxholes” (Pargament, 2002, p. 171), and
many empirical studies show that religiousness is per-
ceived as generally intensified and helpful in critical situ-
ations (for review, see Pargament, 1997). For a contem-
porary example, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
U.S. National Public Radio reported that all over the
nation, people turned to prayer for coping with this
stressful event (cf. Ai, Tice, Peterson, & Huang, in press).
However, only few studies exist that examine the inter-
play between terror salience, religiousness, and mental
health (e.g., Ai et al., in press; Peterson & Seligman,
2003). The few studies in this area are furthermore
mainly limited to U.S. samples, are mostly designed as
correlative studies, and seldomly address mediating vari-
ables. The present investigation, which is the first one
employing a European sample on this topic, tries to fill
some of these research gaps. The goal of the current arti-
cle is to examine the impact of terror salience on mood
(positive and negative emotions) and self-efficacy of
intrinsically religious and nonreligious people.
RELIGION AND COPING
The coping literature mainly distinguishes between
external and internal sources of coping with stressful
events (e.g., McIntosh, Silver, & Wortman, 1993). Exter-
nal resources refer to social support: members of social
communities (family, clubs, religious groups, etc.) into
which the individual is integrated respond positively to
his or her expressions of distress about aversive events,
facilitating adjustment to the negative event. By contrast,
internal resources refer to coping processes and out-
comes brought about by cognitive and affective process-
ing, which is affected by the attitudes, beliefs, and
heuristics held by the individual (Koenig, George, &
Siegler, 1988; McIntosh et al., 1993). Because religion
can provide both internal and external resources for
coping, previous research has shown that religiousness
can indeed be considered as an effective way to cope with
stressful life-events (Ai, Dunkle, Peterson, & Bolling,
1998; Ai, Peterson, & Huang, 2003; Ai, Peterson, Tice,
Bolling, & Koenig, 2004; Hill & Pargament, 2003;
McIntosh et al., 1993; Pargament, 1997).
The most accepted approach to religiousness distin-
guishes between intrinsically and extrinsically religious
orientations (Allport, 1959). According to Allport,
intrinsic religiousness is characterized by the striving for
meaning and value. By contrast, extrinsically religious
people have a utilitarian approach to religion; they use
religion to protect the self, find solace, and gain social
standing (cf. Allport, 1966). Allport and Ross (1967) cre-
ated a Religious Orientations Scale, which is a widely
used instrument for measuring extrinsic and intrinsic
religiousness (cf. Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993). Research
on religious orientations has shown that high intrinsi-
cally religious people are more orthodox and ascribe
more importance to religion than do high extrinsic reli-
gious individuals (e.g., Batson, 1976). Furthermore,
compared to high intrinsic religious participants, high
extrinsically religious participants have been found to be
more dogmatic and prejudiced (Batson, 1976; Hoge &
Carroll, 1978). In addition, Pargament, Smith, Koenig,
and Perez (1998) distinguish between positive and nega-
tive religious coping, whereas positive religious coping is
associated with intrinsic religiousness, a secure relation-
ship to God, and positive outcomes for mental health,
and in contrast, negative religious coping is associated
with extrinsic religiousness, a less secure relationship,
and negative outcomes for mental health (for an
overview, see Pargament, 2002).
Most important for our line of reasoning, in several
studies, the intrinsic religiousness scale has been found
to be positively correlated with mental health outcomes,
such as emotional well-being, personal adjustment, self-
regulation, independence from external cues, self-
control, and positive emotions (e.g., Bergin, Masters, &
Richards, 1987; McClain, 1978). No correlations or even
negative correlations were obtained between the extent
of extrinsic religiousness and the mental health out-
comes mentioned above (cf. Bergin, 1991; Bergin et al.,
1987). Further research conducted on a more behav-
ioral level supports the assumption that intrinsic reli-
giousness helps to cope with negative events by showing
that religious individuals cope better, for example, with
the loss of a child (McIntosh et al., 1993), transplant sur-
geries (Tix & Frazier, 1998), medical illness (Koenig,
Pargament, & Nielsen, 1998), cancer diagnoses (Carver
et al., 1993), and natural disasters (Smith, Pargament,
Brant, & Oliver, 2000). Finally, high intrinsically reli-
gious individuals also are known to report lower levels
of anxiety, fear, and concern about death (Hill &
Pargament, 2003; Spilka, Hood, & Gorsuch, 1985). To
sum up, we assume that in the event of crises, especially
intrinsic religiousness helps to experience more positive
and/or less negative emotions, which helps to better
cope with stressful events such as terrorism.
RELIGION, EMOTIONS, AND COPING WITH TERRORISM
From positive psychology (e.g., Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Sheldon & King, 2001), we know
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that it is important for fostering well-being and mental
health to focus on the positive aspects of the human con-
dition, such as positive emotions and attitudes (also see
Ai & Park, 2005; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Accord-
ingly, several studies have found a positive link between
positive emotions and optimistic attitudes, on one hand,
and positive mental and physical health outcomes, on
the other hand (e.g., Ai et al., 2004; Ai, Peterson, Bolling,
& Koenig, 2002; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). Thereby,
intrinsic religiousness is one very important factor that
helps a person to experience positive emotions (Bergin
et al., 1987; McClain, 1978).
Why do positive emotions help to cope with stressful
events? First, positive emotions help to distract from neg-
ative emotions and thus put people’s minds at ease after
they experienced negative events (Fredrickson et al.,
2003). Second, positive emotions can reduce negative
physiological arousal (e.g., increased heart rate, high
blood pressure, vasoconstriction) caused by stressful
events (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Fredrickson,
Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000). And third, posi-
tive emotions can alter people’s modes of thinking about
crisis. Fredrickson (2000) mentioned that positive emo-
tions broaden people’s attention and behavioral reper-
toire, whereas negative emotions narrow attention on
specific action tendencies (e.g., escape).
With special regard to the coping literature, positive
emotions have consistently been shown to facilitate cop-
ing with negative events, for example, positive emotions
facilitate the attention to and processing of self-relevant
information (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; for reviews, see
Aspinwall, 1998, 2001). Other studies have revealed
that experiencing positive emotions helps to cope better
with bereavement because positive emotions during
bereavement enhance developing long-term plans, goal-
setting, and finding meaning in the negative experience
(Keltner & Bonanno, 1997; Moskowitz, 2001). In addi-
tion, within a sample of college students, it was found
that positive emotions are associated with a coping style
that is characterized by generating multiple courses of
action and a broadened perspective-taking on problems
(Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). Finally, Fredrickson
(1998, 2001) has argued that the repeated experience of
positive emotions can even build durable personal re-
sources for coping with stressful events. In her broaden-
and-build theory of positive emotions, she argues that
the broadening engendered by positive emotions builds
up enduring physical, social, intellectual, and psycho-
logical resources for coping with adversity.
In the specific context of terrorism, Fredrickson et al.
(2003) have shown how positive emotions also help to
cope with the threat of terrorism: Consistent with the
broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001), the
authors found that positive emotions in the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on Sep-
tember 11 (such as gratefulness to be alive or to know
that the loved ones are safe) buffer predispositionally
resilient people against depression and support the
increase of psychological resources against crisis.
Thereby, resilience is viewed as a personality trait charac-
terized by the stable ability to overcome negative experi-
ences and to adapt to the permanently changing world
(Block & Kremen, 1996; Fredrickson et al., 2003).
Related to these findings, we argue that intrinsic reli-
giousness is another important and stable factor increas-
ing people’s possibility to experience positive emotions
in the context of stressful events. In agreement with this
line of argumentation, Ai and Peterson (2004) found a
positive association between religiousness, optimism,
and positive coping among Kosovar refugees. However,
in the special context concerning religious coping with
increased salience of terrorism—to our knowledge—
research is rather rare, correlative, and only limited to
U.S. samples; for example, Peterson and Seligman
(2003) found that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in a
U.S. sample, faith-based virtues increased, whereas secu-
lar character strengths did not. Furthermore, Ai et al. (in
press) investigated U.S. students 3 months following the
9/11 terrorist attacks and found a positive association
between spirituality and the use of prayers for coping.
The authors showed that higher levels of initial negative
emotional response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks were
associated with higher use of prayer for coping, which
was in turn related to less post-9/11 distress. Finally, in a
U.S. nationwide longitudinal study, McIntosh, Poulin,
Silver, Holman, and Gil-Rivas (2003) investigated to what
extent religiousness measures predict positive and nega-
tive outcomes in the year following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. In line with our expectations, using a path model
to interpret their data, the authors found a positive link
between personal religion and subjective well-being.
To sum up, there is some previous research showing
that religion facilitates the experience of positive emo-
tions, promotes emotional well-being, and thus helps to
cope with the threat of terrorism. However, this research
evidence is rather thin, limited to U.S. samples, has
mostly been performed using correlative designs, and
mainly does not address the question of how religious-
ness helps to cope with the threat of terrorism. Accord-
ingly, the present two studies try to overcome some of
these shortcomings of previous research. For this rea-
son, we try to directly focus on the associations between
religiousness, terror salience, and mood (positive and
negative emotions), as well as associated processes con-
cerning personal control (which are introduced later).
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THE PRESENT RESEARCH
In the present research, we want to show that intrinsi-
cally religious participants’ mood is less negatively
affected by increased salience of terrorism than the
mood of not intrinsically religious participants. After
experimentally manipulating the salience of terrorism
threat, intrinsically religious and nonreligious partici-
pants were asked to what extent they actually experience
positive and negative emotions (Study 1). Next, we try to
replicate the expected effect of Study 1 in a realistic con-
text with higher ecological validity and further clarify
associated psychological processes of personal control
(self-efficacy). One day (low terror salience) versus 2
months (high terror salience) after the devastating ter-
ror attacks in Istanbul, intrinsically religious and nonre-
ligious participants answered a self-efficacy measure and
reported their actually experienced positive and nega-
tive emotions (Study 2).
STUDY 1
Participants were either informed that intelligence
services had recently assessed terrorist attacks in Ger-
many to be very likely (high salience of terrorism) or rel-
atively unlikely (low salience of terrorism) to happen in
the next few weeks. After this manipulation of terror
salience, we measured participants’ intrinsic religious-
ness and mood (actually experienced positive and nega-
tive emotions). It was hypothesized that a high salience
of terrorism is associated with less positive and/or more
negative emotions only for nonreligious participants but
not for intrinsically religious participants. No differ-
ences were expected between nonreligious and intrinsi-
cally religious participants for the low terror salience
condition.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and forty-six
pedestrians near the university campus volunteered to
participate in this study. The sample consisted of 65
women and 81 men, ages ranging from 17 to 62 years
(M = 30.28 years, SD = 8.45). The experiment was based
on a 2 (salience of terrorism: low vs. high)  2 (intrinsic
religiousness: nonreligious vs. intrinsically religious)  2
(type of emotion: positive vs. negative) factorial design
with repeated measures on the last factor.
Procedure. Participants were recruited in a pedestrian
zone near the University of Munich. The experimenter
asked them if they were willing to participate in a psycho-
logical study dealing with psychological effects of terror-
ism. If they agreed, they were led to an experimental lab
at the nearby Institute of Psychology and were given a
questionnaire that began with the following induction of
the salience of terrorism:
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism is one of the biggest
challenges facing the Western world. After the terrorist
attack on the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, terrorism has reached Europe with the devastating
attacks on Mosques in Istanbul in November 2003 and
the disastrous attacks on trains in Madrid in March 2004,
which alone left over 200 dead. Experts from the Ger-
man intelligence services are sure that Germany will
(not) suffer from a terrorist attack in the near future.
Many signs collected by the German intelligence services
support the assumption that in Germany there currently
is (no) high risk of terrorism.
Following the manipulation of salience of terrorism, par-
ticipants responded to the following questions as a ma-
nipulation check of the salience of terrorism: (a) “How
likely do you think is it that similar terrorist attacks will
happen in Germany in the near future?” (0 = not at all
likely, 10 = extremely likely); (b) “How likely do you think is
it that you personally will become a victim of terrorism in
Germany?” (0 = not at all likely, 10 = extremely likely); and
(c) “How often do you think about the threat of terror-
ism?” (0 = not often, 10 = very often). Because these three
items were highly intercorrelated (rs ranging from .47 to
.74), we collapsed them into a scale of “salience of terror-
ism” ( = .75).
Next, we measured participants’ attitudes toward ter-
rorism (“What is your attitude toward terrorism?” –5 =
very negative, +5 = very positive) and al-Qaida (“What is
your attitude towards al-Qaida?” –5 = very negative, +5 =
very positive) because it is possible that the intrinsically
religious participant group includes more participants
who sympathize with the aims of religiously motivated
terrorists than in the nonreligious participant group. If
so, they might be less upset by the increased threat of
terrorism in the high terror salience condition. Both
variables were highly intercorrelated (r = .72) and there-
fore were collapsed into a scale of “attitude to terrorism”
( = .84).
Afterward, the participants were asked to fill out the
German translation of the intrinsic and extrinsic reli-
gious orientation scale (Allport & Ross, 1967; Zwing-
mann, Hellmeister, & Ochsmann, 1993). An example
for an intrinsic religiousness item is as follows: “I try hard
to integrate my religion into all my other dealings in life”
(1 = not at all true, 9 = exactly true). The extrinsic scale
includes items such as, “The primary purpose of prayer is
to gain relief and protection” (1 = not at all true, 9 = exactly
true). Similar to previous studies using the Allport instru-
ment (cf. Zwingmann et al., 1993), we first created a
scale for participants’ intrinsic religious orientation ( =
.82) and then created a dichotomous quasi-experimental
factor for participants’ intrinsic religiousness (non-
religious vs. intrinsically religious) via median split
(Mdn = 2.27). Because extrinsic religiousness represents
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no “real” religiousness, the following analyses mainly
focus on intrinsic religiousness.
Finally, participants’ current positive and negative
emotions were measured with an established instrument
developed by Brunstein (1993). Positive emotions were
measured by the items “lucky, happy, satisfied, and confi-
dent” ( = .80); negative emotions were measured by the
items “sad, depressed, frustrated, and anxious” ( = .70).
Participants were asked to what extent they currently feel
these emotions; all items ranged from 0 (not at all) to 10
(very strong). Afterwards, participants were debriefed
and thanked for their participation.
Results and Discussion
Check for manipulation and interfering effects. With
regard to the scale “salience of terrorism,” a 2 (intrinsic
religiousness1)  2 (salience of terrorism) factorial analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main
effect for salience of terrorism, F(1, 142) = 4.23, p = .04,

2 = .03. Participants in the low terror salience condition
overall reported a lower salience of terrorism (M = 2.68,
SD = 1.76) than did participants in the high salience of
terrorism condition (M = 3.40, SD = 2.11). Thus, the
manipulation of “salience of terrorism” was successful.
No further effects occurred, all Fs < 1.27, all ps > .26.
Furthermore, with regard to the dependent variable
“attitude to terrorism,” a 2 (intrinsic religiousness)  2
(salience of terrorism) ANOVA revealed no significant
main effects or interactions, all Fs < 2.38, all ps > .12.
Thus, the following reported effects cannot be attrib-
uted to differences between nonreligious and intrinsi-
cally religious participants with regard to their a priori
attitude to terrorism.
Moreover, we checked whether our salience of terror-
ism manipulation affected the subjective degree of
intrinsic religiousness. A 2 (salience of terrorism)  1
one-way ANOVA with the dependent variable “intrinsic
religiousness” revealed no significant main effect, F(1,
144) = 2.77, p = .10, 2 = .02, indicating that the salience
of terrorism manipulation did not significantly affect re-
ported intrinsic religiousness.
Finally, a 2 (intrinsic religiousness)  2 (salience of
terrorism)  2 (gender)  2 (type of emotion) ANOVA
with repeated measures on the last factor revealed that
neither participants’ age nor gender was significantly
associated with “type of emotions,” all Fs < 1.06, and they
did not interact2 with the manipulation of terror sali-
ence, F < 1.
Positive and negative emotions. Means and standard de-
viations for positive and negative emotions are shown
in Table 1. A 2 (salience of terrorism)  2 (intrinsic reli-
giousness)  2 (type of emotion) ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last factor revealed a significant main
effect for “type of emotion,” F(1, 142) = 503.49, p = .001,

2 = .78, indicating that participants experienced more
positive (M = 7.54, SD = 1.54) than negative emotions
(M = 2.20, SD = 1.62). However, this main effect was quali-
fied by a significant three-way interaction3 between “type
of emotion,” “intrinsic religiousness,” and “salience of
terrorism,” F(1, 142) = 4.84, p = .03, 2 = .03. Follow-up
analyses separately conducted for positive and negative
emotions revealed a significant two-way interaction be-
tween “salience of terrorism” and “intrinsic religious-
ness” for positive emotions, F(1, 142) = 4.19, p = .04, 2 =
.03, and a marginal interaction for negative emotions,
F(1, 142) = 3.44, p = .07, 2 = .02.
With regard to positive emotions, comparisons of the
low and high terror salience condition separately con-
ducted for nonreligious and intrinsically religious par-
ticipants revealed that positive emotions of nonreligious
participants were marginally reduced by a high (M =
7.16, SD = 1.19) compared to a low salience of terrorism
(M = 7.75, SD = 1.39), F(1, 71) = 3.60, p = .06, 2 = .05. By
contrast, no significant differences concerning positive
emotions occurred for intrinsically religious partici-
pants with regard to low (M = 7.30, SD = 1.84) and high
salience of terrorism (M = 7.76, SD = 1.63), F(1, 71) =
1.27, p = .26, 2 = .02. To put it differently, given high
terror salience, intrinsically religious participants (M =
7.76) experienced marginally more positive emotions
than did nonreligious participants (M = 7.16), F(1, 71) =
2.98, p = .09, 2 = .04. In contrast, given low terror sali-
ence, no significant differences in experienced posi-
tive emotions occurred between intrinsically religious
(M = 7.30) and nonreligious participants (M = 7.75), F(1,
71) = 1.42, p = .24, 2 = .02.
Concerning negative emotions, nonreligious partici-
pants reported marginally more negative emotions after
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TABLE 1: Positive and Negative Emotions as a Function of Intrinsic Religiousness and Terror Salience
Intrinsic Religiousness
Positive Emotions Negative Emotions
Terror Salience No Yes No Yes
Low 7.75 (1.39) 7.30 (1.84) 1.92 (1.69) 2.33 (1.67)
High 7.16 (1.19) 7.76 (1.63) 2.66 (1.66) 2.05 (1.45)
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high (M = 2.66, SD = 1.66) rather than low salience of ter-
rorism (M = 1.92, SD = 1.69), F(1, 71) = 3.38, p = .07, 2 =
.05. By contrast, intrinsically religious participants’ re-
ported negative emotions were not differently affected
by high (M = 2.05, SD = 1.45) or low salience of terrorism
(M = 2.33, SD = 1.67), F(1, 71) = 0.55, p = .46, 2 = .01. Fur-
ther simple-effects analyses revealed that given high ter-
ror salience, intrinsically religious participants (M =
2.05) experienced marginally less negative emotions
than did nonreligious participants (M = 2.66), F(1, 71) =
2.73, p = .10, 2 = .04. No differences between intrinsi-
cally religious (M = 2.33) and nonreligious participants
(M = 1.92) occurred under conditions of low terror
salience, F(1, 71) = 1.01, p = .32, 2 = .01.
The analysis of the experimental design did not reveal
any further significant effects,4 all Fs < 1, all ps > .52. The
reported interaction between “type of emotion,” “intrin-
sic religiousness,” and “salience of terrorism” did not
change when extrinsic religiousness was controlled as a
covariate in the overall analysis (p = .03). Moreover,
extrinsic religiousness did not affect the dependent vari-
able or interact with terror salience, all Fs < 1, all ps > .35.
Study 1 revealed that only nonreligious participants’
mood was negatively affected by the increased salience
of terrorism. In contrast, the mood of intrinsically reli-
gious participants was not differentially associated with
high and low salience of terrorism. Further analyses
revealed that these mood differences between nonreli-
gious and intrinsically religious individuals are both due
to differences with regard to positive and negative emo-
tions: Intrinsically religious people experienced more
positive emotions and less negative emotions under con-
ditions of high terror salience than did nonreligious par-
ticipants. No differences between both groups occurred
under conditions of low terror salience. In sum, the re-
sults of Study 1 support the expectation that intrinsic
religiousness helps people to cope with adversities
caused by increasing salience of terrorism. In a second
study, we try to replicate this finding with a community
sample in the context of a real-life terrorist attack, which
provides a higher ecological validity compared to the
typical, undergraduate, lab-experiment samples. In
addition, Study 2 attempts to shed some further light on
associated psychological processes employed in reli-
gious coping with increased salience of terrorism.
STUDY 2
Taken as a whole, previous research has consistently
shown that religiousness helps people to cope with
stressful events in life (e.g., Ai et al., in press; McIntosh
et al., 1993) and thus promotes mental health (e.g.,
Miller & Thorensen, 2003; Pargament, 1997). However,
former research had difficulties explaining the positive
effect of religiousness on mental health (cf. George,
Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Hill & Pargament, 2003). Ac-
cordingly, less research was done on the question of
how intrinsic religiousness facilitates coping with stress-
ful events and, thus, why it has a positive effect on mental
health (see George et al., 2002; Hill & Pargament, 2003).
One important hypothesis—which was directly tested in
the present Study 1—is that intrinsic religiousness pro-
motes positive emotions and, thus, facilitates coping
with adversity because positive emotions help to distract
from negative affect, reduce physiological arousal, and
alter cognitive processing (see Fredrickson et al., 2003).
However, in our opinion, another factor exists that
correlates with the positive effects of positive emotions,
which has received scant attention thus far: All of the
mentioned positive effects of positive emotions on cop-
ing also should be associated with a greater feeling of
personal control and self-efficacy in the coping process
because they increase people’s resources for coping
(e.g., by broadening the scope of available coping
actions, providing physical power, etc.; see Fredrickson
et al., 2003). In addition, not only positive emotions trig-
gered by intrinsic religiousness but also factors especially
inherent to intrinsic religiousness might increase the
sense of self-efficacy that reflects the expectation of
being able to control challenging environmental de-
mands by performing adaptive action (Bandura, 1997;
Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995; Schwarzer & Scholz,
2000): According to the argumentation put forward by
Ellison (1991), religiousness is basically associated with
feelings of self-efficacy, which result from an increased
sense of control over the external world and its adversi-
ties and therefore increases intrinsically religious indi-
viduals’ emotional well-being. Although this line of rea-
soning has not been directly empirically investigated so
far, it is supported by related findings. For example, it
was shown that religiousness provides a belief system
that enables individuals to integrate negative experi-
ences with prior assumptions and worldviews more
quickly (Horowitz, 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; McIntosh
et al., 1993; Parkes, 1972) and thus to better keep up a
sense of own control and self-efficacy. Furthermore, reli-
gious people believe that after praying they will receive
help from a personal god, another factor that should
increase religious individuals’ sense of self-efficacy in
the context of stressful events (Hall & Edwards, 2002;
Kirkpatrick, Kellas, & Shillito, 1993). Other authors
found a positive correlation between religious activities
and personal control (Benson & Spilka, 1973; Jackson &
Coursey, 1988; Shrauger & Silverman, 1971). Finally, and
most directly, Ai, Peterson, Rodgers, and Tice (2005)
found in a sample of cardiac patients that increased
internal control was positively related to the use of
prayer for coping. Based on these findings and assump-
tions, and transferring them to our research question,
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we posit that intrinsic religiousness furthermore helps
people to cope with the increased salience of modern
terrorism by bolstering and/or increasing intrinsically
religious individuals’ sense of self-efficacy, which is asso-
ciated with an enhanced experience of positive
emotions. This line of reasoning is tested in a
straightforward way in Study 2 in the context of the
Istanbul terrorist attacks.
In November 2003, Istanbul, the capital of Turkey, was
shocked by a series of devastating terrorist attacks: On
November 20th, suicide car bombers attacked two syna-
gogues in central Istanbul, killing 23 people and injur-
ing more than 257. Only 5 days later, parallel explosions
occurred at the British Consulate and the Turkish head-
quarters of the London-based HSBC bank in Istanbul,
killing at least 15 people and wounding more than 300.
Terrorism experts said the bomb blasts in Istanbul were
the work of al-Qaida. Due to the fact that Turkey was
never considered to be a prime target of al-Qaida terror-
ism and that 2.1 million Turkish people live in Germany,
the suicide attacks in Istanbul also increased the fear of
al-Qaida terrorism occurring in German cities. Accord-
ingly, the Istanbul terror attacks can be seen as a natural
manipulation of the salience of terrorism being very
high immediately after the terror attacks (on the same
day) and comparatively lower, for example, 2 months
later. Accordingly, in Study 2, we investigated mood (pos-
itive and negative emotions) and self-efficacy of nonreli-
gious and intrinsically religious individuals at the same
day and 2 months after the second wave of the Istanbul
terrorist attacks. It was hypothesized that on the day of
the terrorist attacks, terrorism is highly salient for both
nonreligious and intrinsically religious people; however,
the mood of intrinsically religious people was expected
to be less negatively affected than the mood of nonreli-
gious people. Furthermore, we expected that this effect
is mediated by different levels of experienced self-
efficacy: Because of their belief in a helping god, intrinsi-
cally religious people have a greater sense of self-efficacy
immediately after the attacks than do nonreligious peo-
ple, and associated with that, feel better than nonreli-
gious people. Two months after the Istanbul terrorist
attacks, the experienced salience of terrorism should
have faded somewhat and therefore no differences be-
tween both mood and self-efficacy of intrinsically reli-
gious and nonreligious people are expected.
Method
Participants and design. Seventy-four people sitting in a
Munich cafe volunteered to participate in a study on the
impact of terrorism on different areas of life.5 The sam-
ple consisted of 33 women and 41 men, ranging in age
from 21 to 62 years (M = 30.61 years, SD = 8.99). The
experiment was based on a 2 (time of measurement: the
day of the terrorist attacks in Istanbul [November 20,
2003] vs. 2 months later [February 2, 2004])  2 (reli-
giousness: nonreligious vs. intrinsically religious)  2
(type of emotion: positive vs. negative) factorial design
with repeated measures on the last factor. Forty-three
individuals participated on November 20, 2003, and 31
individuals participated on February 2, 2004. No indi-
vidual participated on both occasions.
Procedure. Participants were recruited from the same
cafe in Munich, Germany, during both times of measure-
ment. They were given a questionnaire that began with a
short description of the second wave of terrorist attacks
in Istanbul that had happened several hours (vs. 2
months prior) to questioning. Next, participants re-
sponded to the question, “How likely do you think is it
that similar terrorist attacks will happen in Germany in
the near future?” (0 = not at all likely, 10 = extremely likely)
and subsequently filled out the German translation of
the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation scale
(Allport & Ross, 1967; Zwingmann et al., 1993; scale of
intrinsic religiousness:  = .77, Mdn = 2.50). As in Study 1,
for further analyses, only the intrinsic religiousness scale
was used. The participants’ next task was to reply to sev-
eral questions containing a questionnaire on general
self-efficacy (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) containing
10 items on a scale from 1 (not at all true) to 4 (exactly
true). Two examples of the items used are as follows: “I
always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard
enough” and “Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how
to handle unforeseen situations” ( = .89). Then, as in
Study 1, participants’ current mood was measured with
Brunstein’s instrument (1993) distinguishing between
positive ( = .82) and negative emotions ( = .76).
Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
Results and Discussion
Five participants had to be excluded from further
analyses: Four of them failed to complete the question-
naire and one of them was not fluent enough in German
to enable participation.
Check for salience of terrorism and interfering effects. A 2
(intrinsic religiousness)  2 (time of measurement)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for time of
measurement, F(1, 65) = 4.22, p = .04, 2 = .06. Several
hours after the second wave of the Istanbul terrorist
attacks (M = 5.32, SD = 2.39), participants’ belief in the
likelihood of terrorist attacks happening in Germany
was greater than 2 months after the attacks (M = 4.26,
SD = 1.81). No further significant effects occurred,
all Fs < 1.60. In addition, we investigated whether the
differences that resulted from the salience of terror-
ism affected the intrinsic religiousness measure.
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Accordingly, a 2 (time of measurement)  1 one-way
ANOVA revealed no significant main effect, F(1, 67) =
0.85, p = .36, 2 = .01, indicating that high (M = 2.98, SD =
1.83) and low (M = 2.60, SD = 1.51) salience of terrorism
did not differently affect levels of reported intrinsic reli-
giousness. Finally, further analyses revealed that par-
ticipants’ age or gender was not significantly associated
with positive emotions, negative emotions, or self-
efficacy, all Fs < 1, all ps > .32, and did not interact with the
other factors of the quasi-experimental design, all Fs <
2.39, all ps > .12.
Positive and negative emotions. Means and standard
deviations for positive and negative emotions are pre-
sented in Table 2. A 2 (time of measurement)  2 (intrin-
sic religiousness)  2 (type of emotion) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the last factor revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for “type of emotions,” F(1, 65) = 251.82,
p < .01, 2 = .80, indicating that participants experienced
more positive (M = 7.14, SD = 1.92) than negative emo-
tions (M = 1.96, SD = 1.55).6 Furthermore, this main
effect was qualified by a significant three-way interac-
tion,7 F(1, 65) = 5.56, p = .02, 2 = .08. Follow-up 2 (time of
measurement)  2 (religiousness) analyses separately
conducted for positive and negative emotions showed
that this interaction effect was mainly based on dif-
ferences due to positive emotions, F(1, 65) = 5.29, p = .03,

2 = .08. No significant interaction between time of mea-
surement and intrinsic religiousness occurred for nega-
tive emotions, F(1, 65) = 1.92, p = .17, 2 = .03.
Separate analyses conducted several hours (high ter-
ror salience) and 2 months (low terror salience) after
the terrorist attacks in Istanbul clarified the two-way
interaction for positive emotions: Several hours after the
attacks, intrinsically religious individuals (M = 7.80, SD =
1.30) felt better than did nonreligious individuals (M =
6.47, SD = 1.39), F(1, 36) = 9.23, p = .01, 2 = .20. Two
months after the terrorist attacks, no difference
occurred between intrinsically religious (M = 6.77, SD =
2.97) and nonreligious (M = 7.53, SD = 1.53) partici-
pants, F(1, 29) = 0.80, p = .38, 2 = .03.
To put it differently, nonreligious people experi-
enced less positive emotions several hours (M = 6.47)
rather than 2 months (M = 7.53) after the terrorist
attacks in Istanbul, F(1, 32) = 4.44, p = .04, 2 = .12. By
contrast, intrinsically religious participants reported no
significantly different experience of positive emotions
several hours (M = 7.80) and 2 months (M = 6.77) after
the terrorist attacks, F(1, 33) = 1.90, p = .18, 2 = .05.
The reported interaction between “type of emotion,”
“intrinsic religiousness,” and “salience of terrorism” still
reached significance when extrinsic religiousness was
controlled as a covariate in the overall analysis (p = .03).
Self-efficacy. Means and standard deviations are pre-
sented in Table 2. A 2 (time of measurement)  2 (intrin-
sic religiousness) ANOVA revealed a marginal main
effect for time of measurement, F(1, 65) = 3.80, p = .06,

2 = .06, indicating that participants experienced less
self-efficacy several hours (M = 2.77, SD = 0.71) rather
than 2 months (M = 3.05, SD = 0.54) after the Istanbul ter-
rorist attacks. Furthermore, this main effect was quali-
fied by a significant two-way interaction between time of
measurement and religiousness, F(1, 65) = 4.55, p = .04,

2 = .07. Simple effects analyses carried out separately for
the two times of measurement indicated that several
hours after the terrorist attacks (high terror salience),
intrinsically religious individuals (M = 3.02, SD = 0.61)
perceived themselves as having more self-efficacy than
did nonreligious individuals (M = 2.51, SD = 0.71), F(1,
36) = 5.58, p = .02, 2 = .13. By contrast, 2 months after the
Istanbul terrorist attacks (low terror salience), no signifi-
cant difference occurred between intrinsically religious
(M = 2.99, SD = 0.66) and nonreligious (M = 3.12, SD =
0.40) individuals, F(1, 29) = 0.41, p = .53, 2 = .01.
To put it differently: Several hours after the terrorist
attacks (M = 2.51), nonreligious individuals perceived
themselves as having less self-efficacy than 2 months after
the terrorist attacks (M = 3.12), F(1, 32) = 8.72, p = .01,

2 = .21. With regard to intrinsically religious individuals,
no significant difference occurred between both times
of measurement (several hours: M = 3.02; 2 months: M =
2.99), F(1, 33) = 0.02, p = .90, 2 = .001. No further signifi-
cant effects8 occurred, all Fs < 3.80, all ps > .06.
Mediational analysis. To test whether self-efficacy medi-
ates the interaction between time of measurement,
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TABLE 2: Positive Emotions, Negative Emotions, and Self-Efficacy as a Function of Intrinsic Religiousness and Terror Salience (Distance to Istan-
bul Terrorist Attacks)
Intrinsic Religiousness
Positive Emotions Negative Emotions Self-Efficacy
Terror Salience No Yes No Yes No Yes
Low (2 months) 7.53 (1.53) 6.77 (2.97) 1.33 (1.09) 1.67 (1.79) 3.12 (0.40) 2.99 (0.66)
High (same day) 6.47 (1.39) 7.80 (1.30) 2.67 (1.52) 2.00 (1.51) 2.51 (0.71) 3.02 (0.61)
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intrinsic religiousness, and type of emotion reported
above, F(1, 65) = 5.56, p = .02, 2 = .08, we performed a 2
(time of measurement)  2 (intrinsic religiousness)  2
(type of emotion) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
with self-efficacy as a covariate. Most important, the
interaction between time of measurement, intrinsic reli-
giousness, and type of emotion was no longer significant
when controlling for self-efficacy, F(1, 64) = 2.15, p = .15,

2 = .03. Moreover, the effect of the covariate, self-
efficacy, on type of emotion was significant, F(1, 64) =
18.78, p < .001, 2 = .23. Hence, these results support
the assumption that self-efficacy mediates the relation-
ship between time of measurement and intrinsic reli-
giousness on type of emotions with a substantial reduc-
tion of the interaction effect size from .08 (p = .02) to .03
(p = .15).
To sum up, Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1
in a more ecologically valid context—the Istanbul terror-
ist attacks from November 2003. It revealed that intrinsi-
cally religious participants’ mood was less negatively
affected by conditions of high terror salience than was
the mood of nonreligious participants. In contrast,
under conditions of low terror salience, no mood differ-
ences were found between nonreligious and intrinsically
religious participants. Further analyses revealed that this
effect was due to differences in reported positive emo-
tions: Immediately after the terrorist attacks, intrinsically
religious participants reported higher levels of positive
emotions than did nonreligious participants; 2 months
later, no differences occurred between both groups. In
contrast, no significant differences were discovered with
regard to reported negative emotions. These results are
in line with previous coping research (e.g., Fredrickson
et al., 2003) emphasizing the important role of positive
emotions in coping with adversity. It seems that religious-
ness is one precondition facilitating the experience of
positive emotions in crisis. In addition, immediately
after the terrorist attacks, intrinsically religious par-
ticipants reported a higher sense of self-efficacy than
did nonreligious participants, whereas this difference
was not observed 2 months later. Accordingly, an analy-
sis of covariance showed that there is a significant link
between terror salience, intrinsic religiousness, self-
efficacy, and mood. However, because of the underlying
correlative design, we cannot make assumptions about
the causal direction of this effect.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Terrorist attacks are extremely aversive events that
deeply shake people’s emotions and feelings of personal
control. Religious participation is mentioned as a com-
mon strategy for coping with aversive events. In two stud-
ies, we have shown that intrinsic religiousness helps to
cope with the increased salience of terrorism. Whereas
nonreligious participants reported reduced positive
emotions in conditions with high salience of terrorism,
the degree of experienced positive emotions of intrin-
sically religious participants did not vary with different
levels of terror salience (Study 1 and 2). In addition, in
Study 1, nonreligious participants reported a margin-
ally increased degree of experienced negative emotions
(compared to intrinsically religious participants). How-
ever, the latter effect on negative emotions was not repli-
cated in Study 2. Furthermore, we found evidence that
the effect of terror salience on mood (positive and neg-
ative emotions) is mediated by differences due to the
sense of self-efficacy (Study 2): high salience of terrorism
only negatively affected the self-efficacy of nonreligious
participants, but not the self-efficacy of intrinsically reli-
gious participants. If self-efficacy was statistically con-
trolled for, the differential effect of salience of terrorism
on mood of intrinsically religious and nonreligious par-
ticipants could no longer be obtained. This result sup-
ports the line of reasoning that the negative effect on
mood of nonreligious participants under conditions of
high salience of terrorism is associated with a reduction
of experienced self-efficacy.
Implications of the Present Research
What do we learn from these results? First, terror-
ism negatively affects people’s mood and sense of self-
efficacy, probably because it is extraordinarily difficult to
predict or counteract terrorist attacks and everybody
could be among al-Qaida’s next victims. Indeed, al-
Qaida terrorism with its tendency to be carried out in the
form of devastating suicide bombing is a new kind of ter-
rorism that especially threatens the “normal” lives of
people. This is in contrast to RAF terrorism in Germany
in the 1970s, which was predominantly directed at top-
level politicians and managers. The present research
showed that following an increased salience of terror-
ism, a decrease in self-efficacy is associated with lower lev-
els of positive emotions and in the direction of higher
levels of negative emotions. This supports previous find-
ings showing that low self-efficacy is associated with
higher levels of depression (cf. Schwarzer & Scholz,
2000), whereas higher levels of self-efficacy are associ-
ated with positive emotions (Ellison, 1991) and, thus, a
successful adjustment to a host of negative life events
(Bandura, 1997; Cozzarelli, 1993). Individuals are moti-
vated to predict, explain, and influence what happens in
the world (Skinner, 1996). Suicide bombing terrorism
negatively affects that goal of internal controllability,
and thus, people might feel bad immediately after ter-
rorist attacks. However, the present studies also revealed
that these processes are not universal. Intrinsic religious-
ness helps to bolster the negative effect of terror salience
on mood and self-efficacy.
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Second, with regard to the psychology of religion, our
findings add force and generality to previous efforts to
situate the role of religiousness within models of coping
(Carver et al., 1993; Palmer & Noble, 1989). Former
studies investigated religious coping with stressful life
events unintentionally caused by nature, such as the loss
of a child from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome
(McIntosh et al., 1993) or being diagnosed with cancer
(Carver et al., 1993). However, to our knowledge, there
is no research on religious coping with aversive events
intentionally caused by mankind, such as military con-
flicts or terrorist attacks. Furthermore, previous research
on religious coping was mainly limited to coping with
adversities concretely affecting the individual. Our find-
ings extend that research by showing that intrinsic re-
ligiousness also helps to cope with terrorism, which
threatens both the individual and its whole society/
culture.
Third, the questions of why religiousness promotes
mental health and how religious coping promotes
adjustment to adversity could be clarified in more detail:
Whereas previous research theoretically suggested a link
between religiousness, self-efficacy, and emotions (cf.
Ellison, 1991), the present research shows that religious
coping with aversive events is indeed significantly associ-
ated with increased self-efficacy and positive emotions.
These results demonstrate that positive emotions and
self-efficacy, which both promote mental health, are crit-
ical active ingredients within coping processes of intrin-
sically religious people. Because former research had
difficulties explaining the positive effect of religiousness
on mental health (cf. George et al., 2002; Hill &
Pargament, 2003), our study is an important addition to
this field of research.
Fourth, the current research helps to further under-
stand the effects terrorism has on psychological vari-
ables, such as self-efficacy and mood. Despite its tremen-
dous impact on society, up until this point, there has
been very little research on the psychological effects of
modern terrorism. One exception is a study by
Fredrickson et al. (2003), showing that positive emotions
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center on September 11 buffer people against
depression and support the increase of psychological
resources against adversity. Positive emotions, such as
happiness or confidence, provide more pleasant subjec-
tive experience than do negative emotions, such as anxi-
ety or sadness. Hence, to the extent that positive emo-
tions reduce the focus on negative emotions, they can
put people’s minds at ease, which is a seasonable effect of
positive emotions in crises (cf. Bonanno & Keltner, 1997;
Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000). Our research comple-
ments the work of Fredrickson et al. (2003) by showing
that under conditions of high terror salience, positive
emotions also are promoted by the precondition of
intrinsic religiousness and are associated with a higher
sense of self-efficacy within the group of intrinsic
religious people.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Our research has several methodological limitations:
These include (a) that we used a cross-sectional design
restricting the detection of cause and effect because of
many possible third variables (cf. Miller & Thorensen,
2003); (b) the limited statistical power arising from the
small sample size, especially in Study 2; (c) the use of a
convenience sample, which calls into question whether
our sample is an accurate representation of the whole
population; and (d) the limitation of the regression-
based (ANCOVA) statistical tool we used for the media-
tion test in Study 2. Results based on structural equation
modeling would have provided a better basis for causal
interpretation than the regression-based analysis of
covariance, which we had to use because of the small
sample size. Future research should address these meth-
odological problems and might perform a longitudinal
study that employs the same randomized sample of in-
trinsically religious and nonreligious participants on
two or more separate occasions and uses a bigger sample
(N > 200), thereby enabling an application of structural
equation modeling to come closer to a causal interpreta-
tion of linkages between salience of terrorism, religious-
ness, mood, and self-efficacy.
Second, we have to mention that with reference to
Terror Management Theory, which suggests that people
cope with the awareness of death by investing in some
kind of literal or symbolic immortality (for a recent over-
view, see Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004), one
could have expected that the salience of terrorism
(because of its similarity to mortality salience) might
itself influence the levels of reported intrinsic religious-
ness, and thus our reported effects. However, in addi-
tional analyses for both studies, we did not find any effect
of the terror salience manipulation on the degree of
reported intrinsic religiousness.9 Furthermore, the find-
ings that mortality (terror) salience does not affect the
levels of reported religiousness corresponds with previ-
ous research on Terror Management Theory. For exam-
ple, Burling (1993) investigated whether mortality
salience affected self-reported investments in religion.
In line with our findings, no effects were found.10 To sum
up, our additional analyses and results from previous
research do not support the assumption that mortality
salience or terror salience, respectively, affect the levels
of reported intrinsic religiousness.
Third, the present results suggest that religiousness
helps to maintain positive emotions but seems not to
buffer negative emotions, which is in contrast to previ-
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ous research showing that religiousness also is helpful in
coping with negative emotions (e.g., Ai et al., in press;
McIntosh et al., 1993). However, whereas these previous
studies examined threats that were very personal, such as
health events (e.g., cancer diagnoses, Carver et al., 1993;
transplant surgeries, Tix & Frazier, 1998), the loss of a
child (McIntosh et al., 1993), or a disastrous terrorist
attack in the own country (9/11, Ai et al., in press), the
event in question in the present article (terrorist attack
in another country) did not involve a personal or imme-
diate threat for the participants. On that score, it would
be a fruitful endeavor for future research to investigate
religiousness and emotional response dependent on
whether individuals face a very personal or less personal
threat.
Fourth, a further limitation of our studies is that the
results are restricted to German Christians. We cannot
say whether the same effects of terror salience, mood,
and self-efficacy would have been obtained for partici-
pants of other religions or cultures. For example, St.
George and McNamera (1984) have found that religious
involvement was more strongly related to life satisfaction
and other aspects of well-being for African Americans
than for White Americans with a similar background.
Furthermore, according to the findings of Park, Cohen,
and Herb (1990), Catholics are expected to cope better
with controllable stressful life situations, whereas Protes-
tants are better at coping with uncontrollable stressful
life-events (see also Pargament, 2002). These examples
illustrate the problem of generalizability of findings in
the research area of religious coping and mental health.
Related to this problem is the question of whether intrin-
sic religiousness is the same for the more secular Euro-
pean population and samples outside Europe, such as
the typically more religious samples in the United States.
With regard to intrinsic religiousness in non-European
samples, in another study (Fischer, Greitemeyer, &
Kastenmueller, 2005), we found a higher median (com-
pared to the samples of the present studies) for an ortho-
dox Christian sample from the Ukraine (Mdn = 4.50)
and a Muslim sample from Azerbaijan (Mdn = 4.92).
However, other research has shown that intrinsic reli-
giousness both in Germany and the United States corre-
lates to a comparable degree with the same criteria, such
as the frequency of church attendance or importance of
religion (Hellmeister, 1993; Zwingmann, 1991).
Although these results might support the generalizabil-
ity of our findings, it would be a fruitful endeavor for
future research to address the question of whether our
results on the interplay between intrinsic religiousness,
mood (positive and negative emotions), and self-efficacy
in coping with terrorism also could be obtained in the
United States or other non-European countries.
NOTES
1. Intrinsic religiousness was coded with 0 (not intrinsically reli-
gious) and 1 (intrinsically religious).
2. However, we found a significant three-way interaction between
“intrinsic religiousness,” “gender,” and “type of emotion,” F(1, 138) =
4.13, p = .04, 2 = .03. Follow-up analyses separately conducted for male
and female participants revealed a marginally significant two-way inter-
action between “intrinsic religiousness” and “type of emotion” only for
female, F(1, 63) = 3.58, p = .06, 2 = .05, but not for male participants,
F(1, 79) = 1.36, p = .25, 2 = .02. Further simple-effect analyses show that
intrinsically religious, female participants (M = 1.86, SD = 1.46)
reported marginally less negative emotions than not religious, female
participants (M = 2.61, SD = 1.73), F(1, 63) = 3.60, p = .06, 2 = .05. No
significant differences between not religious (M = 7.67, SD = 1.18) and
intrinsically religious (M = 8.13, SD = 1.47) female participants were
found with regard to positive emotions, F(1, 63) = 1.92, p = .17, 2 = .03.
To sum up, intrinsically religious, female participants have been found
to experience less negative emotions than not religious, female partici-
pants. However, this effect did not interact with the manipulation of
the salience of terrorism and therefore represents no alternative expla-
nation for a potential effect of salience of terrorism on positive and
negative emotions of high and low intrinsically religious people.
3. This three-way interaction was still significant when the effects
of age, gender, and perceived terrorist threat were controlled as co-
variates, F(1, 134) = 4.83, p = .03, 2 = .04.
4. No significant interactions occurred for extrinsic religiousness,
all Fs < 1, all ps > .35.
5. A second, unrelated aim of this study concerned processes of
information seeking. These data are unrelated to the current investiga-
tion and will probably be reported separately (Jonas & Fischer, 2005).
6. No significant interactions occurred for extrinsic religiousness,
all Fs < 1, all ps > .81.
7. This three-way interaction did not change when salience of ter-
rorism was controlled as a covariate, F(1, 64) = 5.31, p = .02, 2 = .08.
8. No significant effects occurred for extrinsic religiousness, all
Fs < 2.13, all ps > .14.
9. In addition, in a related work by Jonas and Fischer (2005, Study
2) on mortality salience and religion, the influence of mortality sali-
ence on religiousness was directly tested (the time of measurement of
religiousness was manipulated and took place either before or after the
mortality salience induction). Again, no effect of mortality salience on
intrinsic religiosity was found.
10. Burling (1993) suggested that this null finding could be ex-
plained by the assumption that religious beliefs are normally deeply
internalized and stable. Therefore, mortality salience might not in-
duce any change in the level of reported religiousness but rather in par-
ticipants’ adherence to religious beliefs, norms, and values.
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